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ABSTRACT. This study applies a theoretical frame-
work, the theory of reasoned action, to the exami-
nation of unethical decision making in job-related
situations encountered by CPAs. A survey method-
ology was employed in which respondents were asked
to use both self-reported and randomized response
techniques for reporting unethical behavior. The
results indicate that individuals are unwilling to
accurately report either unethical behavior or
intention, particularly in situations where there is no
question as to the unacceptability of the action or
the potential penalty as presented in the AICPA
Code of Professional Conduct. Implications for the
accounting profession and research are discussed.
Introduction
Ethical conduct in business has been explored,
documented, and examined over the last 30
years, primarily within the management, mar-
keting, and accounting disciplines. Within
accounting, the examination has sometimes been
in response to Congressional investigations, such
as the Dingell Committee, sometimes by way of
professional response to outside pressure, such as
the AICPA’s Cohen Commission, and at other
times via research into ethics within the
accounting academic community.
This study continues the line of earlier
research in ethics in accounting which concen-
trated on documenting the existence of uneth-
ical behavior among accountants (i.e., violations
of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct)
and dysfunctional audit behaviors such as pre-
mature sign-off of audit steps and underreporting
of time. Most of the earlier research, however,
has not attempted to use a theoretical base for
explaining behavior. When a theory base is
lacking, research is limited in its explanatory
power both for the situation examined, and more
importantly, for other similar situations. Thus, if
an appropriate theory can be found which will
explain ethical behavior, it is possible to extend
the frontiers of understanding to a greater extent.
One important theory of intention and
behavior which has received substantial support
across a number of behavioral domains (Ajzen,
1989) is Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of
reasoned action. While this theory from social
psychology has been found to possess strong
overall predictive utility (Sheppard et al., 1988)
in a number of situations, it has been used only
rarely in ethical decision making (Randall, 1989),
with three exceptions: a study of ethics in
marketing (Dubinsky and Loken, 1989), a study
of cheating in college (DeVries and Ajzen, 1971),
and a study of tax refund error and church
avoidance (Gorsuch and Ortberg, 1983). The
findings of these studies support the concept that
individuals’ ethical intentions and behavior are
similar to other types of intention and behavior
actions.
Generally, the study of ethical/unethical
behavior requires reliance on self-reported data
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since the observance of such behavior is not
possible. The theory of reasoned action also relies
on self-reported behavior. It is, however, unclear
if researchers can “trust” self-reports of unethical
conduct. Previous research has shown that
individuals generally wish to present a favorable
picture of themselves (Selltiz et al., 1976; Randall
and Fernandes, 1991). Therefore, it was antici-
pated that respondents might be unwilling to
self-report unethical behavior accurately.
This may be particularly true in accounting
where the penalty for violating the AICPA Code
of Professional Conduct demeans the profession
as a whole in the eyes of the public (Finn et al.,
1988), has been linked to audit failures (Pearson,
1987), and carries the threat of expulsion from
the profession. It is therefore important that
while using a theory such as the theory of
reasoned action, which can assist in the expla-
nation of intention and behavior, we also ensure
that we get “accurate” responses when self-
reported data must be relied upon.
Prior research (Buchman and Tracy, 1982;
Stem & Steinhorst, 1984) has found an increase
in the frequency of self-reported unethical
behavior when the randomized response tech-
nique (RRT) was used. The purpose of this
paper is twofold: (1) to determine if the theory
of reasoned action can help explain unethical
behavior in situations encountered by accoun-
tants, and (2) to compare the traditional “direct
response” self-report methodology against a
randomized response technique.
Background
The first reported study of ethical conduct in
business was Baumbart’s survey of business
executives in 1961 (Baumbart, 1961). Subsequent
studies have appeared with increasing frequency,
particularly over the last decade (see Randall and
Gibson, 1990, for a review of ethics research).
The accounting profession has also focused more
attention on ethics as a result of investigation and
criticism by Congressional committees and
various professional organizations. The profes-
sion’s responses have included the revision of the
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct and an
increased emphasis on ethics education, including
the development of casebooks, readings books,
and seminars. 
Two early researchers who took seriously the
problem of accounting ethics were Loeb (1971)
and Rhode (1978). Loeb (1971) studied viola-
tions of the professional code of ethics and related
these violations to CPA attitudes and the size of
the firm in which the CPA practices. Several
researchers (e.g., Armstrong, 1985; Shaub, 1989)
have extended Loeb’s work by using Kohlberg’s
(1969) model of cognitive moral development.
Rhode (1978) examined the influence of envi-
ronmental factors on the auditor’s professional
performance. His documentation of the existence
of premature sign-off of audit steps and under-
reporting of time has sparked several studies (e.g.,
Buchman and Tracy, 1982; Kelley and Sieler,
1982; Margheim and Pany, 1986) which have
documented the existence of these types of
dysfunctional behaviors in several different
settings. 
However, most of the work done has lacked
the guidance of either a solid ethical theory or
a well-developed model of ethical and unethical
behavior. This study, therefore, extends research
in the field of accounting ethics by applying a
well-known theory of intention and behavior
from social psychology, the theory of reasoned
action, to explain unethical decision making in
certain situations encountered by CPAs.
Theoretic framework
The theory of reasoned action
The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen, 1989) is
a parsimonious model which assumes that human
beings are quite rational and make systematic use
of the information that is available to them. The
model views an individual’s behavior as following
logically from this information. The major goal
of the theory is to understand and predict a
person’s behavior.
According to the theory, which is summarized
in Fig. 1, the immediate determinant of behavior
(see “1,” Fig. 1) is the person’s intention to
perform (see “2,” Fig. 1). Behavioral intention,
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in turn, is a function of attitude toward per-
forming the behavior (see “3a,” Fig. 1), the
individual’s judgment concerning whether
engaging in a certain behavior is good or bad,
and a subjective norm (see “3b,” Fig. 1), the indi-
vidual’s perception of whether others important
to the individual think he or she should engage
in the behavior. Subjective norm is the social
influence/pressure placed on the individual to
perform or not perform the behavior.
According to the theory, beliefs are the
ultimate source of attitudes and norms. To
explain intention, one must examine underlying
beliefs. For example, the beliefs underlying
attitude toward performing the behavior (see
“4a,” Fig. 1) are one’s salient behavioral beliefs
about performing the behavior and the evalua-
tion of those outcomes. The beliefs underlying
subjective norm (see “4b,” Fig. 1) are normative
beliefs about whether salient referents think the
individual should engage in the behavior, and the
individual’s motivation to comply with those
referents.
Randomized response technique
Because of the sensitive nature of accounting
ethics and the punitive consequences of uneth-
ical behavior for accountants, a social desirability
response bias was likely to make it difficult to
obtain accurate measures of unethical behavior.
It was anticipated that more unethical conduct
would be self-reported using a randomized
response technique (RRT) than using a direct
question technique.
A number of randomized response techniques
(RRT) exist. One particularly useful device was
developed by Stem and Steinhorst (1984). The
device consisted of a two-part spinner (see Fig.
2).
The bottom circle of the spinner contained
gray areas covering 70% of the surface area which
was alternated with white areas comprising the
other 30% of the surface area. A top disc covered
the gray and white areas and had a window that
was used to answer yes/no questions regarding
actual behavior in the given situation. If the
arrow landed on the shaded area, the respondent
was asked to answer the sensitive question truth-
fully. If the arrow landed on the white area, the
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Note: Arrows indicate the direction of influence.
Source: Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, p. 8).
Fig. 1.
respondent was asked to answer as directed by the
spinner, thus providing a surrogate response
which was randomly assigned. Thus, a “yes”
answer may reflect either a randomly assigned




The theory was tested in a field setting using a
mail survey. The questionnaire used the standard
measures of intentions, attitudes toward behav-
iors, subjective norms, behavioral beliefs,
outcome evaluations, normative beliefs, and
motivations to comply, developed by Ajzen and
Fishbein (1980).
Four scenarios depicting unethical situations
encountered by CPAs in the workplace were
provided as hypothetical situations for the
respondent to use in answering the questions.
The four dilemmas depicted were premature
sign-off of audit steps (scenario I), confidentiality
of workpapers (scenario II), independence as
illustrated by continuing to audit a banking client
who was giving preferential loans to the firm’s
employees (scenario III), and accepting an
engagement for which the auditor is not
qualified (scenario IV). These scenarios were
developed using ethical/unethical dilemmas
identified in prior research (Loeb, 1971; Claypool
et al., 1990; Alderman and Deitrick, 1982).
Two versions of the questionnaire (each con-
taining two scenarios to reduce respondent
fatigue) were mailed to 800 subjects randomly
selected from the Washington State Society of
CPA’s membership directory. Thus, 400 subjects
received version 1 of the questionnaire which
included the premature sign-off of audit steps and
the confidentiality of working papers issues. The
remaining 400 subjects received version 2 of
the questionnaire which included the issues of
independence and accepting an engagement for
which the auditor was not qualified. In addition,
each of the two versions was further divided in
half, with 200 subjects being asked to respond
to the questions regarding intention and actual
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Source: Stem and Steinhorst (1984, p. 556).
Fig. 2.
behavior by using the randomized response
method (i.e., the spinner device). The other half
(200 subjects) answered all questions directly,
without using the spinner device.
Of the 800 questionnaires mailed, 220 (31.3%)
were returned by the respondents (96 were
undeliverable). Of those returned, 32 were not
completed because the individuals were in
industry, tax, or government accounting rather
than in auditing. Usable responses numbered 188
(26.7%). While this response rate is lower than
one would hope to achieve, it is comparable both
to similar ethics studies (see Randall and Gibson,
1990, for a review) and to the response rate
achieved (25%) by a WSCPA survey of
Washington State Society members in October,
1991 (The Washington CPA, 1991). The majority
(64.4%) of the respondents were from small,
non-Big 6 firms (with 1–4 partners) and had
worked for 11 or more years (59.0%).
Measures
As noted above, the components of the theory
of reasoned action were measured using stan-
dardized measures set forth by Ajzen and
Fishbein (1980). Although the use of scenarios
meant that the researcher could not actually
observe behavior, respondents were asked to self-
report behavior (either directly or by using the
randomized response technique) by answering
the following questions: “How frequently have
you been in a situation similar (to the one
described in the scenario)?” and “Did you ever
perform (the unethical behavior depicted in the
scenario)?” The first question was answered by
noting the number of times the respondent had
been in a similar situation while the second
question required a yes/no response (see “1,”
Fig. 1).
Intention was measured by two questions
answered on 7-point, fully anchored, scales. One
question asked: “How much would you want to
(perform the unethical behavior described in the
scenario)?” with 1 = very much and 7 = not at
all. The second question asked: “How likely is
it that you would (perform the unethical
behavior described in the scenario)?” with 1 =
extremely likely and 7 = extremely unlikely. (See
“2,” Fig. 1).
Attitude toward performing the behavior (see
“3a,” Fig. 1) was assessed directly by four items.
Using 7-point, fully anchored scales, respondents
were asked whether they believe performing the
unethical behavior described in the scenario is
good/bad, wise/foolish, ethical/unethical, and
useful/useless. To compute attitude toward
performing the behavior in accordance with the
theory, the four measures were summed to create
a single scale.
Attitude toward performing the behavior was
alternatively assessed as a function of behavioral
beliefs and outcome evaluations (see “4a,” Fig.
1). To measure behavioral beliefs, respondents
were asked to assess the likelihood (using a 7-
point, fully anchored scale) that a particular
outcome will occur as a result of performing the
unethical behavior depicted in the scenario. Each
questionnaire had a different number of specific
behavioral beliefs identified through the litera-
ture review, interviews, pilot test, and pretest. For
example, in the questionnaire using the scenario
depicting a premature sign-off of audit steps, ten
specific behavioral beliefs were used (e.g., “I
believe signing off on the audit steps would
enhance my job security with the firm”).
To measure outcome evaluations, respondents
were asked to rate on a 7-point scale how good
or bad the outcome is, where 1 = extremely
good and 7 = extremely bad. An outcome was
listed for each behavioral belief. Thus, for the
questionnaire using the scenario depicting the
premature sign-off of audit steps, respondents
were asked their perceptions of how good or bad
the ten outcomes were (e.g., “Feeling secure
about your job with the firm”). Following the
Fishbein and Ajzen methodology, each pair of
behavioral belief and evaluation outcome
measures were multiplied together and the
products were summed to arrive at a single score
representing an indirect measure of attitude
toward performing the behavior (see “4a,”
Fig. 1).
The respondent’s subjective norm toward
performing the unethical behavior (see “3b,”
Fig. 1) was assessed directly in global fashion by
asking the question: “Most people who are
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important to me would probably think I should
(perform the unethical behavior described in the
scenario)” using a 7-point, fully anchored scale
from strongly agree to strongly disagree. An
alternative measure of subjective norm (see “4b,”
Fig. 1) was computed as a function of norma-
tive beliefs with respect to specific referents and
the motivation to comply. Significant others were
identified through the literature review, inter-
views, pilot test, and pretest. For example, for
the questionnaire using the scenario depicting
premature sign-off of audit steps, six referent
others were used (e.g., The audit supervisor
would probably think I should sign-off on the
audit steps”). A 7-point scale was provided for
responses with 1 = extremely likely to 7 =
extremely unlikely.
Motivation to comply (see “4b,” Fig. 1) was
assessed by asking the respondents to rate their
desire to comply with each of the referent others.
Thus, for the questionnaire using the scenario
depicting premature sign-off of audit steps,
respondents were asked, “Generally speaking, I
want to do what my audit supervisor thinks I
should do.” Respondents were asked to rate their
responses on a 7-point scale, where 1 =
extremely likely to 7 = extremely unlikely.
Following the Fishbein and Ajzen methodology,
each pair of normative belief and motivation to
comply items were multiplied together and the
products summed to arrive at a single subjective
norm score.
To test the reliability of the scales used to
measure intention and attitude, Cronbach coef-
ficient alphas were computed for each of the
scenarios. The alpha coefficients for all measures
were above 0.75.
Results
The theory of reasoned action and its two
components, attitude toward the behavior and
subjective norm, explained a significant portion
of unethical intention (see “2,” Fig. 1) in the
study of accounting situations (p < 0.001 for all
scenarios except scenario IV for subjective norm,
where p < 0.01). The results also found that
beliefs were the ultimate source of attitude
toward performing the behavior (see “3a, 4a,”
Fig. 1) and subjective norm (see “3b, 4b,” Fig.
1) (p < 0.001 in all cases).
The theory of reasoned action states that the
stronger the intent to perform an unethical act,
the more likely the individual will engage in the
unethical behavior. Past empirical research has
indicated a strong positive relationship between
intent to behave and behavior (Sheppard et al.,
1988). However, in this study differences
between the mean intention of those who engage
in the unethical behavior and those who do not
engage in the unethical behavior (see “1”,
Fig. 1) could not be tested for scenarios I and
III because no respondents self-reported per-
forming the unethical act. Moreover, the
computed t-statistics for scenarios II and IV were
not significant. This result may be attributed, in
part at least, to the lack of power due to the small
number of individuals self-reporting unethical
behavior for these scenarios. 
The difference between the direct responses
and the RRT responses was tested for each
scenario by computing “Z” statistics to compare
the proportion of “yes” responses received from
the RRT respondents to the behavior question
with those obtained from the direct “yes”
responses to the same question. The proportion
of “yes” responses from the RRT questionnaires
was adjusted to remove the expected surrogate
responses (Buchman, 1983; Buchman and Tracy,
1982).
As shown in Table I, the differences between
RRT responses and the direct question responses
were significant for three of the four scenarios
(scenarios I, II, and III), indicating a tendency
toward more honest responses (i.e., more admis-
sion of unethical behavior) from those using the
RRT device than from those responding to the
direct question regarding unethical behavior.
Not only were there significant differences
between the RRT and direct responses with
respect to self-reported behavior, but differences
were also found with respect to self-reported
intention when the respondents were asked
whether they intended to perform the depicted
unethical act. When a strong level of intention
not to perform the unethical act was reported,
significant differences were found between the
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direct and the RRT responses for scenarios I and
III, but not for scenarios II and IV. As noted
earlier, scenarios II and IV dealt with issues
which lend themselves to more liberal interpre-
tations and justifications of actions with respect
to the Code of Professional Conduct, but
scenarios I and III dealt with dilemmas which are
clearly against the Code. No differences between
RRT and direct answer respondents were found
when examining the intention data on the end
of the scale indicating a weak intention to
perform the unethical act. As a social desirability
bias indicates that individuals would tell the truth
in this area, this finding could be anticipated.
That is, there is no incentive to state that one
intends to perform an unethical act when in fact,
one does not intend to perform such an act.
Discussion and implications
Additional insight into the reasoning the subjects
used as they responded to the scenarios was
gathered in the “comments” section of the
questionnaire. These insights are particularly
interesting in view of the results previously
discussed. 
As noted above, scenarios I (premature sign-
off of audit steps) and III (independence as
depicted by continuing to audit a banking client
who was giving preferential loans to the firm’s
employees) were the most difficult to justify
unethical actions in view of their explicit prohi-
bition in the Code of Professional Conduct. This
may explain, to some extent, the noted unwill-
ingness of the respondents to directly (as opposed
to RRT) report unethical actions in response
to the depicted situations. In the other two
scenarios (scenario II dealing with confidentiality
of working papers and scenario IV regarding
accepting an engagement for which the auditor
was not qualified), it was possible, to some
extent, for the respondent to justify his/her
actions in a manner which could be interpreted
as not violating the Code. The differences
between the scenarios observed in the examina-
Critical Issues and Decision Making 167
TABLE I
Self-reported behavior direct response vs. RRT response
RRT Direct Z score Confidence level that 
response response “Performed Act” responses
higher with RRT
Scenario I
Performed Act 06 00 1.96 97.5%
Did not Perform Act 28 37
Total 34 37
Scenario II
Performed Act 08 02 2.31 99.0%
Did not Perform Act 27 35
Total 34 37
Scenario III
Performed Act 10 00 2.58 99.5%
Did not Perform Act 28 46
Total 38 46
Scenario IV
Performed Act 15 12 1.13 87.0%
Did not Perform Act 23 33
Total 38 45
tion of the data were confirmed by the written
responses to the question “What do you believe
a fellow CPA would do in this situation?”
Interestingly, but not surprising, in discussing the
above question, the respondents generally indi-
cated that even though they would not perform
the unethical act, they believed their fellow CPAs
would. 
In scenario II, while 5% of the direct ques-
tionnaire respondents stated that they had granted
access to audit files in instances such as this
without the client’s permission, 33% of those
answering the question stated a belief that their
peers would grant access. Other individuals
suggested calling a small number of clients and
obtaining their permission to show their file, and
then granting access to only those files. Others
indicated that since other CPAs are bound by the
Code of Professional Conduct, it would be
acceptable to show them the files: “Confiden-
tiality among professionals can be maintained.”
Scenario IV may have best illustrated the
pressure to “keep the client” while still doing
quality audit work. Eighty-seven percent of those
commenting stated that a fellow CPA would
audit the unfamiliar segment of the business.
Almost all qualified their answer by indicating
that the fellow CPA would perform the audit
because he/she would either (1) take the neces-
sary steps to become familiar with the mining
segment, (2) hire staff with the required exper-
tise, (3) contract with another CPA firm with
mining expertise to do that part of the audit, or
(4) consult an expert. Scenario IV is the only
scenario in which a significant difference was not
found between the RRT and the direct
responses. It may be that this scenario was seen
as one dealing with the CPA’s competence at
least as much as it dealt with ethical issues.
Scenario III also illustrates the pressure that
exists to keep a client. While 83% believed that
a fellow CPA would discontinue the audit of the
S&L, most were not willing to lose the audit
without first making some effort to resolve the
situation and thus ultimately retain the client.
The most frequently mentioned resolution was
to ask the bank to discontinue the loan arrange-
ment. Then, only in the event that the bank
refused to do so, would the client be dropped.
Some respondents suggested requiring the
employees involved to refinance existing loans at
another institution, with the CPA firm assisting
with the refinancing costs.
In scenario I, even though no direct response
participants admitted to premature sign-off of
audit steps, 22% of those who answered this
question stated they believed fellow CPAs would
sign off on the audit step without doing the
work. In addition, respondents suggested other
options to sign-off, such as taking work home
but not reporting the time, and reducing the
work on a particular audit step. These options
are mentioned in the literature (Alderman and
Deitrick, 1982; Kelley and Margheim, 1987;
McDaniel, 1991) as other dysfunctional behav-
iors exhibited by auditors when faced with time
pressure situations.
Implications for accounting practice
Managers of CPA firms who wish to encourage
ethical conduct among their employees will find
the results of this study useful. The finding that
intention to behave unethically is a function of
both attitude toward performing the behavior
and social pressure, as well as the beliefs behind
these constructs, is important if one wishes to
influence intentions and ultimately behavior.
Employees’ intentions to engage in a particular
behavior increase when they believe that the
behavior will lead to a desirable outcome. In
cases where the chosen behavior might be
unethical, the employer must change the belief
that the behavior leads to a desirable outcome if
he/she wishes to change behavior.
Management can go further by clearly com-
municating to employees any potential negative
consequences that will result from engaging in
various unethical behaviors, and correspondingly,
to communicate positive consequences that will
result from engaging in ethical behaviors. This
may not directly change the evaluation of such
outcomes by the individual, but it should
influence beliefs by reinforcing the belief that
ethical behavior is good and desirable. 
This study also indicated that individuals’
intentions and behavior are influenced by others
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who are important to them. Recognizing this,
if managers wish to encourage ethical conduct,
they must insure that consistent messages
regarding the importance of ethical conduct
come from all potential important others. This
study found that important others included
authority figures, fellow staff and peers, family,
and regulatory bodies. Since management has
easy access to several of these significant referents
(authority figures, fellow staff and peers), there
is ample opportunity to encourage these refer-
ents to support ethical behavior. For example,
management may make significant referents into
role models by providing public recognition for
ethical actions.
In general, respondents indicated they intend
to do quality work and are willing to take the
necessary steps to keep up-to-date and knowl-
edgeable. However, few recognized any potential
limits to the acquisition of necessary knowledge.
While such confidence is necessary to succeed
as a CPA, overextending that confidence could
lead to situations where substandard work is
performed, with potential consequences of public
embarrassment and lawsuits.
As noted above, scenarios III and IV gener-
ated comments which clearly illustrate the
intense pressure that exists in the profession to
“keep the client.” While keeping clients is
essential for the firm’s success, there is an
inherent danger that the client will be kept at any
cost, including the cost of associating with clients
and being involved in situations which may lead
to violations of the Code of Professional
Conduct and unsavory legal and professional
sanctions.
Implications for research
The results of the study indicate that, when
comparing the direct with the RRT responses,
individuals appeared to be unwilling to accurately
report unethical behavior. This finding is con-
sistent with prior research (e.g., Buchman and
Tracy, 1982). It may be that direct self-reports
of unethical activity are understated, particularly
in situations where the unethical nature of the
behavior or the interpretation of the Code of
Professional Conduct is not ambiguous. Since
research on ethical/unethical behavior usually
must rely on self-reported data, it appears prefer-
able to use a randomized response technique
when asking questions of a sensitive nature.
Indeed, a natural extension of this study is to
test the theory of reasoned action by using RRT
to gather data on the “intentions” variable.
However, one warning is appropriate before such
an extension is planned. Fox and Tracy (1984)
note that a test using only the RRT approach
necessitates a fairly large sample size (250–500)
in order to reduce the standard error of the
parameter estimates because the model would
need to be formulated as a measurement error
model. Usual multivariate procedures would then
be applied to the data.
In discussing the results of this study, the
following limitations should be kept in mind.
The generalizability of this study is limited
because the majority of the respondents were
from small, non-Big 6 firms and had worked for
11 or more years. In addition, the low response
rate should be considered in generalizing the
results beyond the respondents. Although this
study used scenarios, as is often done in business
ethics research (e.g., Baumbart, 1961; Murphy
and Laczniak, 1981; Fritzsche and Becker, 1983),
scenarios can create problems in the areas of
relevance (Fredrickson, 1986) and realism
(Randall and Gibson, 1990).
Conclusion
The theory of reasoned action provides a useful
theoretical explanation for unethical behavior
among CPAs in the state of Washington. An
accountant’s intention to behave unethically is a
function of both attitude toward performing the
behavior and social pressure, as well as the beliefs
behind these constructs. Accountants appear to
be unwilling to accurately report either uneth-
ical behavior or intention, particularly in situa-
tions where there is no doubt as to the
unacceptability of the action or the potential
penalty as presented in the AICPA Code of
Professional Conduct.
The comments on the dilemmas presented in
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the scenarios revealed two particularly troubling
problems for the accounting profession. First,
while the respondents indicated their willingness
to do quality work and to please the client, the
lack of stated limits as to the extent of their
confidence in their abilities is of concern to the
profession. Second, the pressure that exists to
keep a client may, at times, lead CPAs to justify
actions which may be in harmony with the letter,
but not the spirit, of the Code of Professional
Conduct. In either case, there exists the possi-
bility that the CPA may either perform inade-
quate work and/or expose the individual and/or
the firm to potential liability suits.
Of concern to researchers is the possibility that
self-reported unethical behavior may be under-
stated due to the social desirability bias against
reporting unethical behavior, particularly in
situations where sanctions are clearly in place.
Until techniques, such as RRT, are utilized fre-
quently by researchers, the accounting profession
may never know the true extent of unethical
behavior that occurs.
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